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A NEW BURDEN OF PROOF IN NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS INVOLVING STATUTORY
VIOLATIONS?
The topic of proximate causation has probably spawned as much
controversy in legal literature as has any other subject in the field of
torts.' Nevertheless, one facet of the law relating to proximate causation had until recently been well settled-in a negligence action, the
plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant's negligence
caused the injury or harm which was suffered. 2 In a negligence action, the plaintiff is generally required to prove four separate elements:
(1) that defendant owed him a duty of care; (2) that defendant
breached that duty; (3) that plaintiff suffered some actual harm; and
(4) that such harm was proximately caused by the defendant's breach
of the duty of care.3 The first two elements, if proven, establish the
negligence of the defendant;4 however, for the plaintiff to recover damages the remaining two elements must also be established by the plaintiff.
The behavior of a defendant-to constitute negligence-must fail
to conform to a required standard of conduct, usually that of a reasonably prudent man. The determination as to whether a particular defendant has or has not been negligent-whether he has or has not acted
as would a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstancesis one of fact left for the jury.5
Certain types of behavior are proscribed by statute, and the statutory standard is adopted as defining what is proper conduct in deterIn negligence actions involving statutory violamining negligence.'
tions, negligence is deemed established as a matter of law in California
1. See Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369 (1950).
2. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
3. Id. § 30, at 143.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. § 37, at 207.

generally held that those who violate such ordinances are
6. "[Ilt is ...
liable for resulting injury to others. The standard of conduct of a reasonable man
may be established by a statute or ordinance. The violation of such a legislative
enactment may be negligence in itself if the plaintiff is one of a class of persons
whom the statute was intended to protect and the harm which has occurred is of the
type which it was intended to prevent." Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409,
416, 218 P.2d 17, 21 (1950).
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if the jury- finds that the defendant acted in the manner proscribed by
the statute.7 The finding of negligence alone, however, is not enough
to support a verdict for plaintiff. The harm to the plaintiff and the
causal relationship-proximatecause-between the negligence and the
harm suffered must still be established. 8 Therefore, as a general rule, the
plaintiff must establish both negligent conduct and proximate causation
to win the lawsuit.
In the recent California case of Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,9 the
state's highest court developed an exception to this general rule and
held that when the defendant, a public pool owner, violated specific
statutory provisions-failing to provide either a lifeguard or a sign
warning that no lifeguard was present-the defendant had the burden
of proving that his violation was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. 10 Although the court in Haft relied heavily on a legislative
policy peculiar to the statutory provision involved,:" its determination
may well have significant ramifications in California tort law.
This note will discuss the judicial interpretations of California
Health and Safety Code section 24101.4 as a standard of conduct in
negligence actions and will analyze the court's holding in Haft which
changed the traditional view that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof
as to the issue of proximate causation. The note will analyze the public policy considerations implicit in the court's decision and will also
consider some of the problems that may be faced by the court should
the reasoning underlying Haft be extended to other negligence actions.
Background and Decisions of the Lower Courts
Mr. and Mrs. Morris Haft and their five year old son were vacationing in Palm Springs, California, at the defendant's hotel. The hotel office, a number of units, and a swimming pool were located on the
east side of a major thoroughfare; other units and two pools-one for2
adults and a wading pool for children-were located on the west side.'
Mr. Haft and his young son were using the pool across the street from
the hotel office and were the only persons present in the pool area.
Another hotel guest testified at trial that he had observed Mr. Haft and
his son first in the wading pool and then later in the big pool, and that
when he returned to the pool area a half hour later, he discovered the
7. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 763, 478 P.2d 465, 468, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 748 (1970); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 36, at 200.
8. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 36, at 193.
9. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
10. Id. at 765, 478 P.2d at 469, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
11. Id. at 774 n.19, 478 P.2d at 476 n.19, 91 Cal. Rptr. at756 n.19.
12. Id. at 761-62, 478 P.2d at 467, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
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bodies of both Mr. Haft and his son on the bottom at the deep end of
the large pool. 3 After an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve the two
bodies, the guest telephoned the hotel switchboard operator who called
the police and fire departments; subsequent efforts to revive the two
victims were unsuccessful.
Mrs. Haft filed suit against the hotel owner alleging that his negligence in failing to provide lifeguard services had resulted in the death
of her son and husband. The plaintiff's task was made particularly
difficult because there was no direct evidence to establish the circumstances surrounding the two deaths."4 The plaintiff did, however, produce uncontradicted evidence that the defendant had violated numerous statutory provisions regarding the swimming pool area and also
established that the defendant had been previously cited for similar violations.'5 Six specific statutory violations by the defendant were highlighted by the court: (1) failure to post a sign warning that children
were not to use the pool without an adult present, 6 (2) failure to
provide a lifeguard, or to post a sign advising swimmers that a lifeguard was not present, 17 (3) omission of required depth markings on
the edge of the pool to indicate the depth of the pool or the slope of the
pool to the bottom,' 8 (4) failure to provide a chart with instructions for
emergency mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, 9 (5) failure to provide a
list of emergency telephone numbers, 2° and (6) failure to maintain
21
several twelve-foot life poles at poolside.
The plaintiff had attempted to introduce the prior statutory violations as evidence of the willfulness of the defendant in his violation of
these code provisions. 22 All such evidence, including two of the reports of earlier inspections by the county health department notifying
defendant of these violations, was excluded by the trial court.2"
The jury found the defendant not liable for the two deaths, and
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 763, 478 P.2d at 468, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
See CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, § 7829.
Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24101.4 (West 1967).
18. See CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, § 7788.
19. See id. § 7829.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. 3 Cal. 3d at 778, 478 P.2d at 479, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
23. These reports did not specify which of the two pools was the site of the
various violations; as a result, the reports were ruled too remote for jury consideration, and the trial court instiucted that they be disregarded. Id. On appeal it was
determined that such an instruction alone was reveisible error, since defendant's knowledge of the safety requirements was a crucial issue. The reports would have tended to
establish his knowledge of the violations. Id. at 779, 478 P.2d at 480, 91 Cal. Rptr.
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the court of appeal affirmed the jury verdict. The plaintiff then sought
and obtained a hearing by the California Supreme Court.
Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court
The supreme court initially reviewed Health and Safety Code section 24101.4 and held that the express wording of the statute was the
key to determining the extent of the defendant's liability for the statu-

tory violations:
Lifeguard service shall be provided for any public swimming
pool which is of wholly artificial construction and for the use of
which a direct fee is charged. For all other swimming pools,
lifeguard service shall be provided or signs24shall be erected clearly
indicating that such service is not provided.
The defendant had argued that his statutory obligation regarding
lifeguard service would have been satisfied if he had erected a sign
notifying swimmers of the absence of a lifeguard.2 5 The defendant
thus reasoned that since the two decedents were alone in the pool
area, the absence of a lifeguard would have been obvious and the absence or presence of a sign advising that no lifeguard was present could
not have had any effect. The defendant concluded that his liability
should be limited to only the consequences flowing from his failure to
post an adequate sign. Since it could not be shown that the mere
presence of a sign would have deterred the swimmers or prevented the
two deaths, the defendant contended that he should not be held liable
merely for failing to post the required sign. 6
at 760. This of course was relevant only to the issue of defendant's willful and
wanton misconduct, as defendant's ignorance would not excuse his violations and thus
not effect his liability for negligence. Id.
24. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24101.4 (West 1967) (emphasis added). Lifeguard service is defined by Health and Safety Code section 24100.1 to mean "the
attendance, at all times that persons are permitted to engage in water-contact sports,
of one or more lifeguards who hold Red Cross or Y.M.C.A. senior lifeguard certificates or have equivalent qualifications and who have no duties to perform other than
to superintend the safety of participants in water-contact sports."
Code provisions applicable to public swimming pools may be found both in article
three of the Health and Safety Code and in title 17, subchapter five, group six of
the Administrative Code. Health and Safety Code section 24102 authorizes the state
department to "make and enforce such rules and regulations pertaining to public
swimming pools as it deems proper." Title 17 section 7775 of the Administrative
Code defines the public pools to which such regulations apply as "all pools, as
defined herein, except private pools maintained by an individual for the use of
his family and friends. These regulations shall apply to, but are not limited to, all
commercial pools, real estate and community pools, pools at hotels, motels, resorts, auto
and trailer parks, auto courts, apartment houses, clubs, public or private schools, and
gymnasia and health establishments."
25. 3 Cal. 3d at 767-68, 478 P.2d at 471-72, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
26. Id. at 768, 478 P.2d at 472, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
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The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that section 24101.4 imposed a statutory duty on public pool owners, like the defendant, to either post a sign or to maintain lifeguard service. Moreover, the plaintiff contended that the liability of the defendant for not having posted
a sign warning that no lifeguard was present should be measured in
27
terms of the absence of a lifeguard rather than the absence of a sign.
The plaintiff had sought specific jury instructions to this effect in the
trial court, but the court merely set forth the statutory language, without interpretation, in the instructions given to the jury.2 8
As previously discussed, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the verdict had been upheld by the court of appeal. Significantly, the court of appeal did not base its affirmance upon the
issue of statutory construction2 9 and, indeed, suggested in dictum that
the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute was possibly correct. 30 Nevertheless, the court of appeal held that since the plaintiff had failed to
this issue could not
insist on proper jury instructions during the trial,
31
be raised for the first time at the appellate level.
The California Supreme Court, however, found that the plaintiff
had properly presented the issue of statutory interpretation to the trial
court 32 and also concluded that the final instructions to the jury were
improper in that the absence of definite guidelines by the trial judge
encouraged speculation by the jury on a legal issue.3 3 The supreme
court suggested that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that
the defendant, as owner of a public swimming pool, owed a primary
obligation to have a lifeguard present at the pool. 34 Therefore, the
absence of a lifeguard, and not merely the failure to post a sign, was
held to be the standard to be used in determining the liability of pool
owners who violated section 24101.4.35 In its interpretation of the statute, the court emphasized that the regulatory provisions applied to all
27. Id. at 766, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
28. Id. at 766 n.10, 478 P.2d at 470 n.10, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750 n.10.
29. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316, vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 756,
478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
30. On the question of statutory interpretation the district court of appeal noted
that "[i]f the matter were properly before us we might very well hold that the defendants
cannot escape from the consequences of the wrongful omission to provide lifeguard
service by pointing to the fact that they did not comply with the statutory substitute

either.

But the point is not available to plaintiffs: at their request the court in-

structed the jury [by simply reading the statute]. . . . The error was invited."
Cal. Rptr. at 316.
31. Id.
32. 3 Cal. 3d at 766 n.10, 478 P.2d at 470 n.10, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750 n.10.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 767-68, 478 P.2d at 471, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751.

83
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public pools. This interpretation is the result of fifty years of prior
judicial policy requiring public pool owners to provide lifeguard
service.36

Under the prior cases, the classification of a pool as public was
based on the size and nature of the pool operations rather than on
whether or not a fee was charged. 37 In interpreting section 24101.4,
the supreme court pointed out that there were two different categories
of public pools-those for which a direct fee was charged and those
comprising all the "others. ' . 8 Because the defendant pool owner did
not charge
a direct fee, his pool properly belonged in the "all other"
39
category.
36. In Flora v. Bimini Water Co., 161 Cal. 495, 119 P. 661 (1911), plaintiff
sued defendant for negligence where her son drowned in defendant's public pool. The
court recognized the existence of a duty of "one maintaining a swimming or bathing
establishment frequented by the public" to provide lifeguard service. The court expressly avoided the question of duty, noting that since defendant had provided lifeguards "it is immaterial whether it be said that the duty of furnishing such protection
arises, as matter of law, or that the necessity for such provision is, in each case, a question of fact for the trial court or jury." Id. at 498, 119 P. at 662.
In Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591,
291 P. 848 (1930), defendant's only negligence was failure to provide a lifeguard.
The court held that defendant was not relieved of this duty by posting a sign that
bathers were to use the pool at their own risk. Id. at 597-98, 291 P. at 850.
In a similar case, the district court of appeal determined that "the mere presence
of signs stating that the bather used the pool at his own risk would not affect the
duty of appellants to have a qualified life guard on life-guard duty at the pool."
Lindsey v. De Vaux, 50 Cal. App. 2d 445, 456, 123 P.2d 144, 150 (1942).
In the only case before Haft to interpret Health and Safety Code section 24101.4,
a state appellate court held that "[il]ifeguard service must be provided for any 'public
swimming pool' for the use of which a direct fee is charged, and for all others lifeguard
service must be provided unless a sign is posted indicating that such service is not
provided." Lucas v. Hesperia Golf and County Club, 255 Cal. App. 2d 241, 248,
63 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1967) (emphasis added).
37. The court looks at the physical size and the number of persons having
access in determining if the pool is public or private. The court in Rovegno applies
this criteria in the following passage: "While it is true [the pool owner] constituted
a private corporation and a private association, respectively, they were in fact maintaining and managing a swimming pool of large dimensions, to which some six hundred
or seven hundred persons, together with their invited guests, had access. In such circumstances we believe that the amount of care with which they were chargeable
would approximate the amount chargeable to the proprietor of an institution to which
the public generally was invited." 108 Cal. App. at 597, 291 P. at 850. The fact that
a direct fee is not charged is not determinative. See Askew v. Parker, 151 Cal. App.
2d 759, 312 P.2d 342 (1957), where a religious institution issued an invitation to the
teenagers of the community to use its pool. There the court looked at the size of
the large and indeterminate group given access to the pool in reaching the conclusion
that the pool was public.
38. 3 Cal. 3d at 767-68, 478 P.2d at 471, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
39. Id. at 766 n.8, 478 P.2d at 470 n.8, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750 n.8.
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The court noted that although the statute could have been worded
by the legislature to limit the duty of such "others" to the mere posting
of a sign warning that no lifeguard was present, the legislature clearly
chose to require the higher standard for both types of pools.4" The
court appears to have arrived at this strict statutory interpretation by
reasoning that the code provision allowing pool owners to post a sign
could not have been intended by the legislature to condone a pool owner's complete inaction.4 1 The court thus concluded that the mere posting of a sign which was provided in the statute could not have been intended to excuse the pool owner of all obligation to potential pool victims, nor intended to allow a defendant to avoid liability by showing
42
he had observed neither the lifeguard requirement nor its substitute.
Such an interpretation of the statute was found to be unacceptable by
the court, since a negligent defendant would be allowed to effectively
escape liability by inaction and this was found to clearly undermine the
legislative purpose behind the statute-to
minimize the danger of ac3
cidental drownings in public pools.1
In support of this interpretation of the statute the court cited a
court of appeal case, Lucas v. Hesperia Golf and Country Club,4 4 decided some four years earlier, in which section 24101.4 had been similarly interpreted. Lucas involved a negligence action for the wrongful death of a minor in a country club swimming pool. As in Haft,
no fees were charged for the use of the pool and there had been no
lifeguard present; the evidence conflicted as to the presence of the required sign.4" Without extended discussion, the court interpreted section 24101.4 to require the presence of a lifeguard, and this determination by the court was not questioned by the defendant. 6 The key issues in Lucas differed from those in Haft, however, and involved: (1)
the status of the plaintiff as an invitee and (2) whether or not the defendant's pool was public or private.417 The court's assertion in Lucas
of a statutory requirement to have a lifeguard present appears not to
40. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
41. The court noted that the legislation comprising Health and Safety Code sections 24000-109 had been passed in order to minimize "the considerable hazards
emanting from the growing number of unregulated swimming pools."
3 Cal.
3d at 767, 478 P.2d at 471, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751. In particular, section 24101.4 was
enacted because "the Legislature was sufficiently concerned about one particular safety
issue-lifeguard service-that it elected to establish the prevailing requirements
itself." Id.
42. 3 Cal. 3d at 67-68, 478 P.2d at 471-72, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
43. Id. at 768, 478 P.2d at 471-72, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
44. 255 Cal. App. 2d 241, 63 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1967).
45. Id. at 246, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
46. Id. at 251, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
47. Id. at 248-49, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
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have been contested by any of the parties in the action and does not
appear to have received any judicial consideration.
The court in Haft stated that the statutory lifeguard requirement
had been designed to provide protection for swimmers in public pools,48
and the legislature had apparently believed this purpose could best
be effectuated by discouraging inept or careless swimmers from using
the pools except during hours when emergency assistance would be
available. The court concluded that since the harm that occurred in
Haft was exactly the type the statute sought to prevent, 49 the defendant's failure to provide either lifeguard service or a sign warning that no
lifeguard was present violated the statutory duty of care owed to the
decedents. 50
Under California law, when a plaintiff has established that the defendant owed a statutory duty of care and that the defendant has violated this duty of care, the burden of offering a preponderance of exculpatory evidence on the issue of negligence ordinarily shifts to the
defendant. 1 Essentially, the courts have described this situation as
producing a rebuttable presumption that the defendant acted negligently.52- In Haft the supreme court pointed out that since the uncontroverted evidence of defendant's statutory violations created the presumption of negligence, the trial court should have pronounced the defendant negligent as a matter of law. Since the trial judge had allowed the case to go to the jury on the issue of negligence, the court
held this to be reversible error.5"
The Issue of Proximate Causation
As a general rule of tort law, once the defendant's negligence has
been established, the plaintiff has surmounted the first of two major obstacles. 54 The second aspect-often as difficult for the plaintiff as proof
of negligence itself-is substantiation on the issue of proximate causa48. 3 Cal. 3d at 770-71, 478 P.2d at 473, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
49. Id. at 769 n.13, 478 P.2d at 473 n.13, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753 n.13.
50. Id.
51. See Porter v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 48 Cal. 2d 846, 849, 313 P.2d 854,
856 (1957); Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 588-89, 177
P.2d 279, 283 (1950).
52. This presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by evidence showing that, under the circumstances, the conduct in question was excusable, justifiable,
and reasonable for a person of ordinary prudence. See Satterlee v. Orange Glenn
School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 588-89, 177 P.2d 279, 283 (1950). This position is
unique to California. Other jurisdictions hold either violation of statute is negligence
per se or merely evidence of negligence. PRoSsER, supra note 2, § 36, at 200-01.
53. 3 Cal. 3d at 763-65, 478 P.2d at 468-70, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748-50.
54. The plaintiff has traditionally carried the burden of proof on the issue of
proximate causation as well as negligence. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 236.
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tion.5 5 In Haft, the plaintiff was assisted by the traditional rule that
an inference of proximate cause was raised because of defendant's negligence in failing to supply lifeguard service, 56 and this inference was
unaffected by the lack of direct evidence as to what had actually occurred.5 7 Despite the inference that defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the decedents' deaths, the issue was properly submitted as a question of fact to the jury.5" Since the jury in Haft had
found for the defendant, 59 the defendant had argued before the supreme
court that the jury's verdict finding him not liable must be accepted as
conclusively establishing the plaintiffs failure to prove that the statutory violation by the defendant had proximately caused the deaths of
the two swimmers.6 0 The defendant further pointed out that the court of
appeal had sustained the jury's verdict, and had also ruled that plaintiff
was barred from raising the issue of proximate causation on appeal. 6 '
The supreme court rejected the defendant's arguments on the basis that
the trial court had incorrectly ruled on the plaintiff's motions.6 2 The
supreme court reasoned that since the jury had not been given the correct interpretation of the statutory lifeguard provisions by the trial judge,
the jury had been prevented from deciding the proximate cause issue
under the appropriate standard, 63 and the plaintiff was thus not foreclosed from bringing up the issue of proximate cause on appeal. With
the stage thus set, the supreme court turned its attention to the issue of
proximate causation.
The plaintiff had argued that defendant's negligence should be
55. See Gonzalez v. Derrington, 56 Cal. 2d 130, 133, 363 P.2d 1, 2, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 2 (1961).
56. Lucas v. Hesperia Golf & Country Club, 255 Cal. App. 2d 241, 252, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 189, 196 (1967); Lindsey v. De Vaux, 50 Cal. App. 2d 445, 454-55, 123 P.2d
144, 149 (1942); Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal.
App. 591, 595, 291 P. 848, 849 (1930).
57. Lucas v. Hesperia Golf & Country Club, 255 Cal. App. 2d 241, 253, 63
Cal. Rptr. 189, 196 (1967).
58. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 45, at 290.
59. 3 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
60. Id. at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
61. 83 Cal. Rptr. at 316. See note 31 supra.
62. 3 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 470, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750. The plaintiff's
formal request for instructions merely asked that section 24101.4 be read verbatim.
Id. at 766 n.10, 478 P.2d at 470 n.10, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750 n.10. However, earlier
the plaintiff's counsel explicitly moved that both the issues of proximate cause and
negligence be taken from the jury and be decided by the court as a matter of law.

Id. at 764 n.6, 478 P.2d at 468 n.6, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.6. The judge's refusal to
take these issues from the jury was held to be sufficient for plaintiff's appeal. Id. at
775, 478 P.2d at 477, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (issue of proximate cause); id. at 777,

478 P.2d at 479, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 759 (issue of contributory negligence).
63. Id. at 771 n.17, 478 P.2d at 474 n.17, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754 n.17.
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considered the proximate cause of the two deaths under the reasoning
of the court of appeal in Whinery v. Southdrn Pacific Co.6 4 In that
case the plaintiff had brought a negligence action for wrongful death
against a railroad. The decedent had been killed in an auto-train collision, and it had been established that the train was exceeding the statutory speed limit. The court held that the railroad was negligent as a
matter of law because of the statutory violation; however, the court
carefully pointed out that this did not necessarily establish proximate
65
cause-that the railroad's negligence had caused decedent's death.
As in Haft, the critical issue was whether the railroad's negligence had
proximately caused the decedent's death, and there was almost no
direct evidence relating to this issue.6 6 The appellate court held that
since plaintiff's evidence showing the defendant's negligence was uncontroverted, reasonable men could not differ as to whether the railroad's
negligence had proximately caused the decedent's death, and therefore
67
proximate cause was also held to be established as a matter of law.
The effect of the court's holding was to give summary judgment on the
issue of liability against the defendant.
The plaintiff in Haft urged the supreme court to adopt the reasoning of Whinery and to find defendant's negligence the proximate
cause of the two deaths as a matter of law.6" The supreme court did
not agree that the absence of any other explanation for the drownings
would necessarily establish that the defendant's statutory violation had
proximately caused the two deaths. Instead, the court enunciated a
new rule as to the burden of proof regarding proximate causation:
when the plaintiff proved the defendant's statutory violation, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to prove that its negligence was
not the cause of the two deaths. 69 The supreme court held that the
defendant had not sustained his burden of proof that the statutory violation was not the proximate cause of the deaths and thus reversed and
remanded the case. 0 The court emphasized that the case was being
remanded for retrial "[b]ecause the obligation of defendants to bear
the burden on this issue was not clearly defined at the time of the
tria."571
64. 6 Cal. App. 3d 126, 85 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1970). See Appellants' Petition for
Hearing at 22-31, Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1970).
65. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 128, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 650-51.
68. Appellant's Petition for Hearing at 30, Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d
756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
69. 3 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 469-70, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
70. Id. at 775, 478 P.2d at 477, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
71. Id.
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In its decision the California Supreme Court did more than merely
reverse the procedural positions of plaintiff and defendant on the issue
of proximate cause. Before the Haft court's new approach to proximate causation, a plaintiff was required to shoulder the entire burden
of proof as to proximate cause. He was assisted in overcoming his
from the deburden of proof by an inference of causation that arose
72
fendant's negligent violation of the statutory duty of care.
An inference is merely a deduction which the law allows to be
made from another fact or group of facts otherwise established, i.e.,
if fact A is established by evidence, the jury may deduce that fact B
exists. 73 The jury is not compelled to draw the conclusion suggested
by the inference even in the absence of contrary facts.7 1 Thus, before
Haft the defendant was not required to produce any evidence to obtain
a favorable verdict, but the jury could find for the plaintiff on the basis
of this legal inference.
In Haft the court shifted the burden of proof on causation to the
defendant by replacing this inference with a presumption. While an
inference is an allowable deduction, a presumption is a mandatory deduction that is "to be made from . . facts . . . otherwise established,"
i.e., if fact A is established by evidence the jury must find that fact
B exists. 75 It is "forced upon the jury" in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.7 6
To understand the mechanics of shifting the burden of proof one
77
must remember the bifurcated system of presumptions in California.
California recognizes two types of presumptions-those affecting thes
burden of proof and those affecting the burden of producing evidence.7
Most jurisdictions and the Model Code of Evidence recognize only those
affecting the burden of producing evidence.- 9
The practical effect of the two types is different. The presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is the weaker of the
two. It is only an initial assumption in the absence of any contrary evi72. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
73. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1966); see In re Estate of Braycovich, 153
Cal. App. 2d 505, 512, 314 P.2d 767, 771 (1957); Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies,
119 Cal. App. 2d 497, 500, 259 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1953).
74. Garland v. Hirsh, 74 Cal. App. 2d 629, 636, 169 P.2d 405, 410 (1946).
75. CAL. Evm. CODE § 600 (West 1966).
76. Anderson v. I.M. Jameson Corp., 7 Cal. 2d 60, 66, 59 P.2d 962, 965 (1936);
accord, Estate of Roberts, 49 Cal. App. 2d 71, 81, 120 P.2d 933, 939 (1942); Noble v.
Key System, Ltd., 10 Cal. App. 2d 132, 137, 51 P.2d 887, 889 (1935).
77. See Comment, California Evidence Code: Presumptions, 53 CALw. L. Rv.
1439 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Presumptions].
78. CAL. EvID. CODE § 601 (West 1966).
79. Presumptions,supra note 77, at 1441.

February 19721

NEW BURDEN OF PROOF

dence, i.e., evidence sufficient to support a verdict"0 If there is any
contrary evidence the jury weighs "the inferences arising from the facts
that give rise to the presumption against the contrary evidence." 81
If the presumption affects the burden of proof it not only acts to
impose the burden of producing evidence but also the burden of persuasion as well."' Thus the presumption affecting the burden of proof
is more durable since it does not vanish with the mere introduction of
contrary evidence. 83 To overcome this presumption the party against
whom it operates must produce sufficient evidence negating the pre84
sumed fact to convince the jury of that fact's nonexistence.
One can readily see that in Haft the result would have been the
same no matter which presumption the court had imposed since defendant had no evidence to rebut the presumption. Indeed, imposition
of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence would
have resulted in only a minimal departure from previous law.
Although the effect of the two presumptions in Haft would have
been the same, the policy basis for their application is different. All
presumptions have a basis of probability, convenience and social policy.8 8 The two presumptions in California are distinguishable by the
social policy they implement.8 6 A presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence is applied merely to facilitate the determination
of a particular issue.8 7 A presumption affecting the burden of proof
implements some recognized social policy broader in scope and extrinsic
to the particular issues in a particular case.8 8 In California presumptions affecting the burden of proof are both statutory and nonstatutory
thus allowing both legislative and judicial implementation of social
policy.8 9 In Haft we have a judicial recognition and implementation of
a social policy.
An amicus curiae brief filed in Haft had -urged the court to impose strict liability when pool owners violated safety statutes in order
80. CAL. Evm.CODE § 604, Comment (West 1966).
81. Id.
82. Presumptions,supra note 77, at 1444.
83. Id. at 1444-45.
84. CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 115, 606 (West 1966). A presumption affecting the
burden of proof is not evidence to be weighted against other evidence. Instead it
operates as a mandatory conclusion absent sufficient evidence to the contrary. In re
Estate of Roberts, 49 Cal. App. 2d 71, 120 P.2d 933 (1942); Noble v. Key System,
Ltd., 10 Cal. App. 2d 132, 51 P.2d 887 (1935).
85. Presumptions,supra note 77, at 1447.
86. id. at 1447-49.
87. CAL. Evm. CODE § 603, Comment (West 1966).
88. Presumptions,supra note 77, at 1472.
89. Id. at 1492.

662

662

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

[Vol. 23

to more fully implement the legislative intent of the pertinent statutes."
The court refused to adopt a policy of strict liability on the basis that
to do so would have required substantial revisions in the long established policy of allowing contributory negligence to be asserted as a de91
fense in negligence actions predicated on violations of safety statutes.
The court briefly discussed the "relative culpability of the parties;" 92 however, there was no indication that the court intended to
acknowledge any standard of comparative negligence, so as to apportion damages according to the relative fault of the parties.93 There
was no mention of any such attempt of apportionment in Haft, and
the primary issue in the case was not the relative fault of the defendant
and the decedents but whether the defendant's negligence had caused
the deaths. In this context, the comments by the court regarding the
relative culpability of the parties appear to have been in the nature of
a policy justification for shifting the burden of proof from an innocent
plaintiff to a negligent defendant.9 4 The court also remarked in a
footnote that its holding in Haft was "consistent with the emerging tort
policy of assigning liability to a party who is in the best position to dis95
tribute the losses over a group which should reasonably bear them.
However, this dictum by the court was made with reference to the
issue of negligence and not to the economic issue of risk distribution for
injuries resulting from negligence.
Negligence of the Decedents as a Defense
Some of the confusion generated by the court's language as to the
underlying policy basis of the decision in Haft was possibly due in part
to the defendant's contention that the decedents had been contributorily
negligent. Two separate issues in this regard had to be overcome by
the court: first, whether the young son could have been deemed contributorily negligent, and second, whether the father's negligence, if any,
90. 3 Cal. 3d at 770 n.14, 478 P.2d at 473 n.14, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753 n.14.
91. "Full analysis of this contention, however, would require a substantial reevaluation of an entire line of California cases which have generally permitted contributory negligence, as distinguished from assumption of risk . . . to be asserted as a
defense in an action grounded in the violation of a safety statute. . . . We do not
believe the instant litigation, in which plaintiffs have not even raised the issue, provides
a proper vehicle for such an undertaking." Id.
92. Id. at 774, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
93. For a discussion of the doctrine of comparative negligence see PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 67, at 434-39.
94. The court left open the possibility that a decedent's contributory negligence
would be a complete defense. 3 Cal. 3d at 770 n.14, 478 P.2d at 473 n.14, 91 Cal.
Rptr. at 753 n.14. This possibility is obviously inconsistent with a comparative negligence scheme. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 67, at 433.
95. 3 Cal. 3d at 775 n.20, 478 P.2d at 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.20.
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could have constituted a superseding cause, overriding the defendant's
negligence.
The trial court had instructed the jury on the issue of decedents'
contributory negligence as follows:
[Ilf you find from a preponderance of the evidence that either
decedent was guilty of negligence which contributed as a proximate cause of his death, no recovery may be had by the plaintiffs
for the death of that decedent who was contributorilynegligent.96
The supreme court held that such instructions by the trial court were
erroneous, in that the jury should have been instructed that the young
97
son could not be deemed contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
The court noted that some evidence had been presented at trial that the
young son was not a good swimmer; however, evidence also suggested
that had the child been alone, rather than under his father's control, he
possessed the requisite intelligence and experience to appreciate the
dangerous situation.9 8 The court found that on the basis of the evidence brought out at trial that at the time of the tragedy the young child
was under the direct supervision and care of his father.9 9 On this basis,
the court concluded that the young child had not acted independently
in entering the defendant's swimming pool and thus could not be
deemed to have acted negligently. The court noted that no prior cases
in California or elsewhere, for that matter, had ever held a young child
negligent for following the directions of his parent. 10 0 Since the child
could not have been independently negligent, the court reasoned that
any fault attributed to him by the jury could only have been imputed to
the child because of the negligence of his father.10 1 The court concluded that imputation of a parent's negligence to his child would not
only be an unfair reason to bar the child's recovery, but California courts
had long repudiated the imputation of parental negligence to children.'0 2 The court ordered that the issue of the young son's contributory negligence be withdrawn from the jury upon remand of the case
to the trial court.
The court noted authority allowing imputation of the contributory
negligence of one parent to the other parent in suits involving recovery
for injuries to the children, so as to bar recovery for the benefit of the
96. Id. at 775-76, 478 P.2d at 477-78, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757-58, quoting the trial
court's instructions to the jury.
97. Id. at 775, 478 P.2d at 477, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
98. Id. at 776, 478 P.2d at 477, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 777, 478 P.2d at 478-79, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59. Generally minors
have been found contributorily negligent only in situations where they have acted
without, or contrary to, parental instructions. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 770-71, 478 P.2d at 473-74, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753-54,
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community. 103 Since the widow in Haft was co-plaintiff, the father's contributory negligence, if established, could have precluded recovery under this theory. However, the court concluded that the doctrine of interspousal imputed negligence was inapplicable in Haft because the negligent spouse could not benefit from the recovery since he was dead,
and there was therefore no more reason to impute negligence to the
non-negligent spouse than to the injured child. -0
The defendant in Haft had also contended that since the father had
acted negligently in allowing his young son into the big pool and in
entering it himself with the knowledge that he was not a good swimmer that such negligence constituted a superseding cause and barred
any recovery for the two deaths. 10 5 The court rejected defendant's argument regarding the father's possible negligence as a superseding
cause on the basis that the likelihood of a careless, unskilled swimmer
overrating his capacity was a foreseeable risk-in fact, the very one the
statute was designed to minimize. 106 Moreover, the type of injury sustained was precisely that which could be reasonably foreseen to occur
if the statute were violated. 0 7 The court thus concluded that the father's possible negligence was foreseeable and should not have been
submitted to the jury as a basis for denying recovery by the plaintiff for
either victim's death.' 0 8
The court's analysis of the father's possible negligence as foreseeable, and thus not a bar to plaintiff's recovery did not mean, however,
that contributory negligence could not be considered as a defense.'0 9
Although foreseeable negligence, against which the defendant bore
the statutory duty to guard, could not have constituted a superseding
cause, any unforeseeable negligence by the father might still have justified a defense of contributory negligence. Of course, no such negligence had been shown by defendant at the trial, but the court held that
the defendant should be allowed the opportunity to pursue the issue on
retrial. 01
For a
103. Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288, 301, 144 P.2d 356, 364 (1943).
thorough discussion of imputed negligence see Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622,
628-32, 248 P.2d 922, 925-27 (1952) (Traynor, J.).
104. 3 Cal. 3d at 770 n.15, 478 P.2d at 474 n.15, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754 n.15.
See note 94 supra.
105. Id. at 769, 478 P.2d at 473, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753; See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965).
106. 3 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 478 P.2d at 471, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751.

107.

Id. at 769 n.13, 478 P.2d at 471 n.13, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751 n.13.

108. Id. at 770, 478 P.2d at 473, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
109. For a discussion of the defense of contributory negligence see PROSSER,
supra note 2. § 65.
110. 3 Cal. 3d at 772 n.18, 478 P.2d at 475 n.18, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.18.
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Formulation of the Haft Policy
The supreme court compared the situation in Haft to that of other
California tort cases where the burden of proof as to proximate causation had been shifted from plaintiff to defendant. The court chose as
illustrative the cases of Summers v. Tice,'
Ybarra v. Spangard'
and several other cases involving multiple tortfeasors.. 3 Each of the

cited cases involved a situation where the issues of negligence and proximate causation were so clear as not to be at issue; the primary issue in
these cases was the fact that there had been a number of negligent
defendants and the plaintiff was unable to conclusively prove which of
the negligent defendants had proximately caused the resulting harm.' 14
The decisions in Summers, Ybarra, and similar cases in which the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant, were based on the same judicial policy: if the collective result of the independent acts of individual defendants has caused injury to the plaintiff and thereby rendered impossible a determination of the extent to which each was responsible, total liability should be imposed upon each defendant unless
he can supply the facts necessary to absolve himself. 1 5 Presumably,
in these cases, the courts have reasoned that it would be better to hold
liable a negligent defendant who did not actually cause plaintiff's injuries than to deny plaintiff an effective remedy. 11 6 Application of
111. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
112. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
113. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 675, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964); Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App. 2d 209,
23 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1962); Eramdjian v. Interstate Bakery Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 590,
315 P.2d 19 (1957); Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876 (1949);
Cummings v. Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d 549, 107 P.2d 282 (1940).
114. In Summers two defendants simultaneously shot in plaintiff's direction who
was struck by the pellet from one of their shotguns. In Ybarra, a hospital patient
under anesthesia was injured by someone on the medical staff, but he could not prove
which individual had actually caused the injury.
Among the many representative multiple tortfeasor cases were two cited by the
court in Haft. In one, Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 227 Cal. App. 2d 675, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964), defendant's illegal conduct plus
other nontortious factors combined to cause damage to the plaintiff. In the other,
Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App. 2d 209, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1962), plaintiff was
injured in a chain reaction rear end collision in the fog. The entire series of collisions
took place within a matter of seconds, so that it was virtually impossible to assert
conclusively which defendant caused which of plaintiff's injuries.
115. "Where. . .there is evidence that two or more persons independently contribute to a result and it is impossible to determine the extent to which each contributed to the result, the burden is upon the defendants to absolve themselves of liability." Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App. 2d 209, 214, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461, 464
(1962).
116. Indeed, Justice Traynor characterized the shift of the burden of proof in
Summers as having been based on the policy that "it is preferable to hold liable a
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this evolving judicial policy has, however, been limited to cases of multiple defendants; and even then this judicial approach has not been applied when the evidence was sufficient to show which of the several
negligent defendants "immediately inflicted the injuries."1 1
The court's analogy of the situation in Haft to Summers, Ybarra
or the other cited cases is unclear since those decisions really centered
on the problem of apportioning damages when the collective acts of a
group caused plaintiff's injury."' In contrast, there was only one defendant in Haft, so no issue of damage apportionment existed. The
sole issue was whether or not the defendant's acts had caused the injury. Although the cases with which the court compared Haft often
involved different factual and legal issues, there was one significant
point of similarity: in each, an innocent plaintiff sought to collect from
a clearly negligent set of defendants. The court in Haft might have
been alluding to this type of relationship in referring to the "relative
culpability of the parties." ' 19 The crux of the decision in Haft thus
appears to have been this special relationship between a grossly negligent defendant and an innocent plaintiff. The defendant's numerous
violations of the swimming pool safety statutes were viewed by the
court as sufficiently culpable to justify the shifting of the burden of
proof to the defendant.12 0 The court further noted as justification
for shifting the burden of proof that the defendant was at least partially
responsible for the lack of evidence as to the specific cause of the
deaths-had there been a lifeguard present, the court concluded,
However, the court
there would have been eyewitness testimony. 12
appears to have mentioned this point to demonstrate that the defendnegligent defendant who did not in fact cause the injury than to deny an innocent
plaintiff any remedy when it cannot be determined which of the defendants is responsible for the harm but it appears one of them was." Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal.
2d 674, 682-83 n.2, 321 P.2d 1, 7 n.2 (1958) (dissenting opinion) quoted in Haft v.
Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 774 n.19, 478 P.2d 465, 476 n.19, 91 Cal. Rptr.
745, 756 n.19 (1971).
117. Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 555, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 401
The court in Thornton refused to follow the Summers rule even when there
(1962).
were multiple defendants, because it was unclear if any of the defendants proximately
caused plaintiff's injury. The court stated that the Summers rule was a limited one
and was designed to be used only "where a plaintiff can prove the negligence of two
or more independent defendants, but is unable, from the nature of the case, to identify
which defendant's acts actually injured him." Id. at 554n., 26 Cal. Rptr. at 400n.
118. For a general discussion of the apportionment of damages from a collective act see PROSSER, supra note 2, § 52, at 319-20.
119. 3 Cal. 3d at 773, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756. The term "relative fault" has also been used. Id. at 772-75, 478 P.2d at 475-78, 91 Cal. Rptr. at
755-58.
120. Id. at 769, 478 P.2d at 473, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
121. Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 474, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
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ant in Haft was even more culpable insofar as the creation of the evidentiary void than the defendants in cases like Summers. 2 2 The court
noted that the shift in the burden of proof to the defendant in Summers was premised on a judicial preference to find a negligent defendant liable, even though he may not have caused plaintiffs injuries, than
to deny an innocent plaintiff relief because of an insufficiency of evidence establishing which of the negligent defendants caused the injury. 23 In Haft, the court found similar justification for shifting the
burden of proof to effectuate a judicial policy favoring the recovery for
an innocent plaintiff, when there was a "substantial probability" that
the negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries and was
at least partly responsible for the evidentiary void as to what had actually happened.S
Extension of the Haft Rule to Future Cases
The facts in Haft revealed so unmistakably a pattern of neglect
by the defendant that one may question whether the court's holding was
predicated on that basis alone." 5 The following factors present in Haft
seem likely to be the key to possible future application of the judicial
policy enunciated in the case: (1) the defendant's negligence was at
least a partial cause of the plaintiff's lack of evidence, 2 6 and (2)
there was a "substantial probability" that the defendant's negligence
caused the injuries complained of.' 27 Although these two elements
may not have been the sole determinants in Haft, they may suggest the
scope of the rule established therein.
Even though the first of these factors would be readily determinable in appropriate cases in which there was no direct eyewitness testimony, the second factor-that there was a "substantial probability"
that defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's injuries-as justification
for the policy of shifting the burden of proof' 28 to the defendant may
prove troublesome in future cases. The court seems to have -used the
term "substantial probability" to describe a relationship between defendant's negligent act and the plaintiff's injuries. Under the court's
reasoning in Haft it appears that the plaintiff must establish as "substantially probable" that the defendant's negligence caused the harm
complained of, and once this has been established he has fulfilled his
burden with regard to proximate causation and the burden then shifts
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
Id. at 774 n.19, 478 P.2d at 476 n.19, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756 n.19.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 12-21 supra.
3 Cal. 3d at 774 n.19, 478 P.2d at 476 n.19, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756 n.19.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
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to defendant to escape liability. Regrettably, the court is unclear as to
what causal relationship will satisfy the "substantially probable" test
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury in order for
the burden of proof regarding causation to be shifted to the defendant.
The causal relationship in Haft was based on the rule of California law
that the defendant's statutory violation in failing to provide a lifeguard
established negligence as a matter of law and this in turn gave rise to
a strong inference of proximate causation. The court found that the
inference of such causal relationship was "substantially probable" and
justified shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant to negate such
causation. The scope to be given the policy behind the Haft decision
will of necessity be determined by future construction of the standard of
"substantially probable" causation. In Haft the defendant was negligent as a matter of law and attention centered on the causal relationship between the negligent act and the injury. The question remains
whether the Haft rationale, which was based on "considerations of policy and justice" and "the relative positions of the parties," will be equally
applicable in cases when the defendant is not deemed negligent as a matter of law. Insofar as "considerations of policy and justice" are concerned it would seem to matter little whether a defendant was merely
negligent or negligent as a matter of law. There would appear to be
no policy justification for prohibiting the application of the policy behind the Haft decision to cases where plaintiff's evidence raises an inference rather than a presumption of negligence. The negligence of
the defendant would, of course, be a question of fact to be settled by
the jury, and if the jury determined that there was no negligence then
there would be a verdict for the defendant. However, if the jury found
that the defendant was negligent, then there would appear to be no
reason for distinguishing this plaintiff from the plaintiff in Haft in
which case the court, to be consistent, should shift the burden of proof
to negate proximate causation to the defendant. If the policy of the
California courts is, as Haft seems to say, to favor the innocent plaintiff over the negligent defendant, there would appear to be no sound
objection to applying the Haft rationale to the broad range of California negligence actions since, by definition, the negligent defendant
will be the more culpable party. Such a policy, if applied by the California courts will signal a major change in tort law-a change which
may be more in tune with a California society that is changing and becoming increasingly concerned with the morality and fairness of individual actions.
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